Fulton Analysis: What Went Wrong Part One
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What Went Wrong I: Offensive Scheme
As the defending national champion with a bevy of returning starters, Ohio State entered 2015 with high expectations. Yet the Buckeyes failed to make the college football playoff - largely because of relative offensive inefficiency. Although the Buckeyes led the Big Ten in points per game, by both basic and advanced statistical metrics, the Ohio State offense performed worse than it did in 2014.
The ineffectiveness resulted from Urban Meyer's offensive staff's struggles with certain defensive tactics throughout the season - issues that came to the fore in losing to Michigan State. Today I will examine those defensive strategies and Ohio State's ineffective response. Next week I will spotlight personnel weaknesses that limited how Ohio State could respond.
Three Level Dance
Every defense Ohio State faced in 2015 had its own scheme. But within those separate philosophies, opponents used similar tools - with the overall strategy of limiting Ezekiel Elliott and the Ohio State tight zone run game.
Defenses used three basic tactics. First, opposing coordinators slanted their fronts away from Ezekiel Elliott. The goal was to prevent offensive line double teams and take away the backside A-gap - the aiming point for tight zone.
Second, defenses cheated their overhang defender - the player aligned over the slot receiver - into the gray area between the receiver and the offensive tackle. Rather than cover the slot receiver, that defender attacked the backside edge when presented with run action.
Third, opponents generally deployed a cover 3 or cover 4 zone. This allowed defensive coordinators to have one or both safeties flow downhill against run action.
Defenses would then have the remaining defensive backs play a soft zone coverage to protect against deep throws and force Ohio State to string together completions.
Sticktoitiveness
Every defensive strategy has holes. The approach the Buckeyes faced was no exception. Defenses were vulnerable to:
runs away from the slanting linemen;
quick passes to the outside against soft zone coverage; and
play action throws to the deep middle behind aggressive overhang and safety run defenders.
Meyer's staff sporadically exploited those areas. And certain lasting adjustments were made - such as running tight zone away from two tight end sets to block overhang defenders.
But - problematically - Meyer's staff would not stick with plays that took advantage of opposing defensive strategy. Instead, they would revert to strategies that played into the defense's hands.
The run game is but one example. Throughout 2015, Ohio State was more successful with gap run plays such as power. Gap runs allowed the offensive line to down block stunting defensive fronts and provide additional blockers at the point of attack. Yet Meyer and his staff continually reverted to tight zone - with poor results.
For instance, against Indiana the Buckeyes struggled in the first half, running tight zone into eight-man slanting fronts.
In the second half Ohio State turned to power - resulting in three Elliott explosive touchdown runs.
Following that game one hoped Meyer's staff belatedly concluded it needed to rely upon gap run plays until defenses adjusted their strategy. Yet in the following contests Meyer's staff reverted to tight zone - resulting in the same struggles.
For instance, Rutgers was largely a replay of the Indiana contest. The Scarlet Knights limited Buckeyes' rushing attack in the first quarter as the Buckeyes ran tight zone into quasi-bear fronts. It was not until the Buckeyes turned to power read - and then power - that Ohio State ran successfully.
The inability to stick with gap runs was all the more galling because Meyer had learned a previous lesson last season against Virginia Tech - leading Meyer and Herman to rely more heavily on gap blocking for the remainder of the 2014 season.
Like Taking Candy...
The Buckeyes likewise failed to consistently exploit soft corner coverage - particularly on first down when defenses had a run-first focus. Opponents knew they had to use soft zone coverage to protect the aggressive application of eight or nine defenders against the run. Yet Ohio State failed to take advantage.
This problem first presented itself against Northern Illinois. Playing a soft cover 3 shell, the Huskies begged the Buckeyes to throw hitch and slants to Michael Thomas.
Yet Ohio State only made two such throws. As with gap runs, it would seem as though Meyer's staff had recognized and exploited the defensive weakness - only to see the problem return. For instance, against Illinois the Buckeyes only threw on 11 of 32 first downs. Yet they were 7-10 on those called passes. And three of the Buckeyes' four touchdown drives contained at least one first down throw.
The failure to take advantage of soft corner coverage was all the more vexing because Ohio State possessed a future NFL wide receiver in Michael Thomas who is tailor-made for such throws.
Similarly, Meyer's staff refused to consistently use wide receiver screens - despite defenses routinely leaving slot receivers uncovered.
A simple response is to throw such screens until the overhang defender has to respect horizontal throws. Without this constraint, Ohio State needed a second tight end to block the additional defenders who did not respect a passing threat.
The Ulcer
But perhaps Ohio State's biggest problem was the lack of explosive plays out of the passing game - despite facing aggressive safety run support.
Opposing defenses were frequently vulnerable on deep crossing and post routes behind run-focused safeties.
Yet Ohio State was unable or unwilling to attack the deep middle. Last season again provides a useful contrast, as the Buckeyes beat Alabama in part by exploiting deep crossing routes.
Because Ohio State did not throw enough on first down - or create sufficient explosive pass plays - they were often left running into stacked fronts. This too often resulted in stuffed plays, putting the Buckeye offense behind schedule - and into must-pass situations that did not play to the offense's strengths.
Because of these passing game inefficiencies, Meyer turned to J.T. Barrett. Barrett's running ability took pressure off the defensive focus on Elliott - particularly by limiting defenses' abilities to slant.
But while this improved Ohio State's offensive efficiency - particularly in the red zone - it did not correct the above strategic problems. Instead, it served as a Band-Aid that covered up questionable choices such as running tight zone into stack fronts. Worse, it increasingly became a crutch, allowing Meyer's staff to put even less reliance on the gap run and passing game.
Perfect Storm
These shortcomings came to a head against Michigan State. The Spartans' cover 4 defense aggressively commits the overhang linebacker and safeties against the run. But Ohio State did not exploit the resulting weaknesses. They instead suffered from the same season-long problems. And in so doing they played directly to the strengths of Michigan State's defense.
These problems were on display in both the run and pass game. The Buckeyes ran power with Elliott on their first scoring drive. But they reverted to tight zone the next drive. They did not run power again.
Similarly, Ohio State threw a quick crossing route to Jalin Marshall early. But hitches and slants to Thomas - or throws to the middle of the field - were largely absent. Nor did Meyer's staff stick with the wide receiver screens that were potentially open.
And the Buckeyes barely attempted to create explosive passes by putting the Spartan safeties in run/pass conflict with throws to the deep middle. Ohio State had a single second quarter attempt where Barrett overshot Braxton Miller on a post route. Yet the Buckeyes did not attempt such a throw again.
Instead, Ohio State largely relied upon Barrett on designed runs. But running the quarterback could not re-equate numbers when Michigan State did not expect the Buckeyes to throw and could apply an unblocked safety.
Too Little Too Late
With Ed Warinner in the booth, the Buckeyes resolved some of these deficiencies against Michigan. Utilizing tempo, Ohio State mixed inside and outside gap runs such as power and power read, threw quick routes on first down, and hit several explosive pass plays off play-action. Although Ohio State only threw for 113 yards, the 11 first down play action throws kept Michigan off-balance and opened the Buckeye run game.
Unfortunately for Ohio State, the placement of Warriner in the booth came too late. Michigan State got into the Big Ten title game. And in so doing, the Spartans effectively locked the Buckeyes out of defending their national championship.
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